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An Introduction to an Era 
In October of 1962 the world came dangerously close to nuclear destruction; 
arguably as close as it had ever come. The first military confrontation to utilize the 
swiftly ushered in technology of the thermonuclear age had come close to taking place 
on the world stage between the two greatest actors of the era: the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Political tensions had grown 
between the two former allies following the end of World War II. The political, 
economic and ideological differences between the Soviets and the Americans only 
served to heighten the apparent suspicion each felt toward the other. Following the 
Second World War, many nations, either willingly or not, came under the economic, 
ideological, and military umbrellas of the two dominant superpowers. The two camps 
tested each other's mettle in several theaters of operation around the globe throughout 
these formative years. There were varying degrees of depth and scope to these 
conflicts: from the use of caustic rhetoriC, to troop and arms activity. Though some of 
these incidents involving the new superpowers and their allies, resulted in spilling the 
blood of men and the blood of theory. None held the breath of the world with the fear of 
total and swift annihilation as did the confrontation which came to be know as the 
Cuban missile crisis. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis; A Brief Overview 
In January of 1959 Cuba's then President Battista had resigned, making way for 
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the Revolutionary forces of Fidel Castro to take control of the small island nation's 
government. Shortly thereafter the United States continued economic relations with 
Cuba, who lay only ninety miles of the U.S. southern shoreline. The following January 
the United States Ambassador to Cuba formally protested the seizure of American 
property by the new Cuban government. In July of 1960 Chairman of the Soviet 
Republics Khrushchev offered Cuba what was termed "rocket support". Castro 
excepted. In the midst of feverishly supporting their policy of the containment of 
communism outside the Soviet Union, the United States reacted to this support by 
embargoing all exports to Cuba with exceptionsof medicine and food provisions. The 
Russian support continued, and by January 3,1961 the United States had officially 
severed all diplomatic relations with CUba. Just over one month later a Cuban 
IRussian trade agreement was finalized and put into operation. 
The President of the United States was advised by his top military counsel as 
well as by the C.I.A. that there was a solution to latest move by the Soviets to extend 
their influence into the western hemisphere. President Kennedy, who only a year 
earlier had defeated staunch Republican conservative and adamant anticommunist 
Richard M. Nixon in a close preSidential race, was advised that if only the people of 
Cuba were given the chance to oust Castro and his Revolutionary government they 
would take up such an action eagerly. If the Cuban exiles from the Battista regime who 
were in the United States were trained and supplied by the U.S, they would be able to 
launch such an initial revolution against Castro. The American government would 
need not claim any direct involvement. Once the exiles hit the beaches of Cuba the 
people would rise up and join them in their cause, or so the C.I.A. and the military 
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claimed. The operation was scheduled for April of 1961. A sight forthe landing was 
chosen on the southern coast of Cuba, once again to help extinguish any suspicion of 
United States involvement. The landing would take place at the Bay of Pigs. 
The operation went anyway but the way the C.I.A. and the other military counsel 
lead the President to believe it would go. Castro's Cuban forces were waiting for the 
exiles when they arrived. The few American aircraft (painted with Cuban markings) 
that were used were wholly ineffective. The people of Cuba did nothing close to the 
eager overthrow of Castro that had been predicted. Instead they protected him and his 
administration. The United States advisors pleaded with Kennedy to utilize American 
air support to help the operation. Kennedy refused. No direct involvement of the United 
States military was said to be needed, it would not be risked now. On April 17 the Bay 
of Pigs invasion was begun. Three days later it had ended in a stunning failure. A few 
weeks later, as if to add insult to injury for the Americans, Fidel Castro announced 
formally that he was a socialist on May 1, 1961. 
On August 29,1962 American U2 spy planes flying high over Cuba were able 
to verify the presence of SAM defensive missiles stations. Wary of how the Soviets 
might be treating their fellow traveler Castro, Kennedy warned Moscow not to 
introduce any offensive missiles into Cuba under threat of U.S. reaction. Khrushchev 
denied the Soviets had supplied or will ever supply Cuba with offensive weapons. The 
Soviets gave Cuba weapons for her defense only, says the Kremlin. On October 14 of 
1962 U2 photographs disclosed Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) and 
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) launching stations under construction in 
Cuba. The combination of these missiles, once operable, would be able to strike most 
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of the continental United States, parts of Canada, as well as some of South America. 
On October 16 President Kennedy called the first two secret sessions of the Executive 
Committee of the National Security CounCil, referred to as "Ex Comm". Included in the 
group of the approximarly fourteen people to act as advisors on the newly developed 
missile situation were Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk, CIA Director John McCone, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 
Maxwell Taylor, Vice President Lyndon Johnson and Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy, the President's brother. 
Ex Comm immediately began discussing several possible courses of action to 
be taken. The choices ranged from a surprise invasion of the island to not doing 
anything whatsoever. The group met at all hours and in secret during the first few 
days, occasionally it met several times in the course of twenty four hours. The 
! i committee began to lean toward the idea of a naval blockade of Cuba. The only items 
that would be excluded from entry into Cuban ports would be anything considered to a 
component of, or an item necessary for, the completion of the offensive weapons. All 
other supplies would be allowed to pass. The term "quarantine" was used as opposed 
to "blockade" for the latter is considered an act of war. 
On October 22, 1962 President Kennedy went on television to inform to public 
of the presence of the missiles and to announce the quarantine. For two days Soviet 
ships plowed toward Cuba and the awaiting American blockade. The Soviets 
denounced the American move as hostile and unprovoked. The Kremlin denied any 
and all claims made by the Kennedy administration. In the two days before the 
Russian ships were to reach Cuba there was much debate and accusation on either 
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side. The U.S. accused the Russians in the United Nations of secretly placing missiles 
in Cuba, severely altering the nuclear status quo. The U2 photographs were shown by 
the U.S. and denounced by the Russians as fakes. It was finally proven, however, that 
MRBM and IRBM silo launchers were being constructed in Cuba and that the 
construction was being performed and supplied by the Soviet Union. 
On October 24 the Soviet ships finally reached the U.S. quarantined area. The 
Russian vessels stopped their engines dead in the water. Ex Comm and President 
Kennedy waited for the next move to be made by the Soviets. Remarkably, the ships 
turned around and headed back to Mother Russia. On October 28, after receiving two 
somewhat different and contradictory offers from the Kremlin, Kennedy agreed not to 
invade Cuba and Khrushchev agreed to remove all the missiles from the sites. In 
private Kennedy allowed the removal of United States Jupiter missiles stationed in 
Turkey to be part of the negotiations. The administration maintained that the removal of 
the Jupiters was already being discussed before the crisis as they were of 
questionable operable status. November 20, 1962, the United States announced the 
removal from Cuba of the last Russian MRBM and IRBM missiles. The world exhaled. 
The Cuban missile crisis had passed. 
The Traditionalist and Revisionist Interpretation 
Hundreds of volumes, essays, and articles contemplating the Cuban missile 
crisis have been written in the thirty two years since those few harrowing days in 
October of 1962. This paper will focus on several representitives examples of this 
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scholarship. Two diametrically opposed schools of thought have emerged concerning 
the prudence of judgment of the leaders involved in the crisis, as well as the decisions 
made by those leaders: the traditionalists and revisionist interpretations. 
The traditionalist interpretation condemns the placement of missiles in Cuba by 
the Soviet Union as an act of direct provocation. The traditionalists applaud the 
actions taken by President Kennedy and the members of Ex Comm as intelligent, 
necessary and correct. They portray the outcome of the crisis as an American foreign 
policy victory. Kennedy himself won praise from the public as well as from the press in 
the days immediately following the Soviet arms withdrawal. 
The revisionist interpretation claims that the people of the United States, the 
Soviet Republics, and those of the world were brought to the brink of nuclear 
Armageddon because the Kennedy administration was merely playing a domestic 
political game. It condemns the actions taken by the American government as mere 
diplomatic fumbling. The revision'ist view also contends that thedecision making 
process used by the United States government in the crisis were wholly unsatisfactory 
and even dangerous.ln this view; the resolution of the crisis was not an American 
victory, but a classic warning of how not to handle negotiations in the thermonuclear 
age (Lebow, 161). A more indepth look at these interpretations can give insight into 
not only this major historical event, but also can provide a compelling detail on how 
the broader subject of history in general is viewed, interpreted, and remembered. 
The Traditionalist Interpretation 
The traditionalists (sometimes also referred to as "court historians") seem to 
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find in President Kennedy at the resolution of the crisis the great leader they thought 
was within JFK and had yet to emerge. Incidents early on in his presidency, most 
notably the Bay of Pigs failure, had supporters wondering if the charisma displayed 
during the debates against Nixon prior to the election would translate into equally 
impressive statesmanship. Even before the crisis in Cuba some historians were 
making way for the predicted greatness of the administration to emerge. Historian 
Herbert S. Dinerstein even took the Bay of Pigs failure and made Kennedy's decisions 
look prudent and wise. Dinerstein wrote, 
·After a brief period of hesitation Kennedy broke off the Bay of Pigs venture 
because, being basically prudent, he decided the game was not worth the 
candle. Kennedy's political history, his failure to denounce Senator McCarthy, 
his careful movement in winning the presidential nomination and the 
deliberateness of his support for the civil rights movement bespoke calculated 
caution·(Dinerstein, 232). 
It was this ·calculated caution· and ·deliberateness· that traditionalists found in 
the deCision making process that surrounded the crisis in Cuba. 
The first argument most often made by the traditionalist camp seems to be the 
most obvious and necessary to their overall doctrine: The placement of missiles in 
Cuba by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics represented a clear and hostile threat 
and required a response from the United States. Leading court historian, Kennedy 
Presidential Counsel, and Ex Comm member Theodore C. Sorensen contends that 
the presence of IRBM and MRBM missiles only ninety miles off the coast of the U.S. 
• ... represented a sudden, immediate and more dangerous and secretive change in the 
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balance of power"(Sorensen, 186). Sorensen goes on to claim that the actions by the 
Soviets clearly and undoubtedly required a response from the United States • .. .for 
reasons of national security in the broadest sense·(Sorensen, 186). The missiles 
placed so close to shores of the United States and placed there in the secretive 
manner in which they were represented a direct and glaring change in the nuclear 
status quo. Whether or not the missiles were to actually change the strategic balance 
between the superpowers is a debatable issue even among traditionalists themselves. 
Even Sorensen agreed that with the United States clear lead in the arms race at the 
time, the balance of power was more than likely shifted in appearance only. He was 
quick to justify that agreement with the idea that • .. .in national will and world 
leadership ... such appearances contribute to reality·(Sorensen, B, 105). Arguably 
then for the traditionalist, the missiles represented some kind of threat to the safety of 
the role of the U.S. as a western hemisphere leader, its citizens and the effectiveness 
of its international foreign policy. The traditionalist argument now moves into the 
question of what to do now that a problem of national security has been defined. 
A number of crisis solution plans floated around the Ex Comm table. The 
military advisors sought either an all out invasion of Cuba, or surgical military strikes 
against the installations themselves. Other factions of the Committee pushed for the 
use of diplomatic measures utilizing the Organization of American States and the 
United Nations as mediating bodies. In the early meetings of the group the concept of 
nonreaction was discussed as a way to halt Khrushchev from inflating the importance 
of the missiles. This avenue of solution was, however, quickly abandoned. Even 
Kennedy himself realized the difficulty in coming to a decision everyone in Ex Comm 
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could, at the very least, live with, if not completely support. The President said at one 
of the Ex Comm sessions • ... whatever you fellows are recommending today, you will 
be sorry for about a week from now·(Schlesinger, 805). This statement should the tone 
of the meetings. The members of Ex Comm were under pressure to make decisions 
quickly. A number of members had changed their minds quickly on the solution they 
felt was best. Kennedy was expressing concem for the correctness of the decision he 
would eventualy implement given the situation it was made under. Ex Comm began 
slowly to lean toward a naval blockade of Cuba. For the traditionalists the blockade 
has been looked at not simply as the lesser of the evils of the other plans, but • ... a 
middle course between inaction and battle, a course which exploited our [the U.S.] 
superiority in local conventional power and would permit subsequent movement either 
toward war or toward peace"(Schlesinger, 804-805). It was the ultimate example of 
diplomatic firmness and flexibility. It allowed Khrushchev time to rethink his actions 
while keeping any further weapons from entering Cuba. Most importantly, the 
traditionalists would claim, it left the U.S. in control of the situation. The nuclear ball 
was now in the Kremlin's court. The Soveits would now have to make the next move. 
For this school of thought the Russians would either have to pull back or take some 
kind of aggressor action. The quarantine would either make the Soveits look weak or 
extremely hostile. The naval blockade of .Cuba gave the Kennedy administration 
" ... control over the future"(Schlesinger, 806). 
The blockade was put in place and the Soviet ship acknowledged it soon 
thereafter on October 24, 1962. For three days terse negotiations took place between 
the Russians and the White House in an extremely tense and anxious atmosphere. On 
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the twenty eighth of October Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed on terms for withdrawal 
of the missiles and the retraction of the blockade. The crisis itself was not completely 
resolved at this time but the most intense segments had passed. Traditionalists reflect 
on this aftermath period as one of great success and perseverance for President 
Kennedy and members of the Executive Committee. Some of those closest to John 
Kennedy during the crisis placed with him praise which equalled him with the great 
men of history. The Prime Minister of England during that October, Harold Macmillan, 
had written, "throughout all the pressures, internal and external, to which he was 
subjected, President Kennedy remained firm and calm· (Kennedy, 18). Secretary of 
Defense and Ex Comm member Robert McNamara said the work of all the agencies 
involved from the Kennedy administration • ... worked together smoothly and 
harmoniously," and that the • ... performance of the U.S. government during that critical 
period was more effective ... • than at any other time during his seven years as Defense 
Secretary (Kennedy, 14). Macmillan again gives more kudos to Kennedy on his 
performance by saying • ... his tactics and sense of timing were perfect ... President 
Kennedy really did preserve both Peace and Honour"(Kennedy, 18). These remarks 
hold tremendous weight for the traditionalist. Prime Minister Macmillan, though not 
directly involved in the negotiations, was a NATO member. His country would have 
most definitely felt the shock waves of the crisis, possibly including a nuclear strike, 
had the situation accelerated from the blockade into full scale military engagements. 
This is the context in which the traditionalist crisis view holders use the Prime Ministers 
statements. 
The traditionalists maintains the notion that, viewed overall, the Cuban missile 
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crisis is to be considered an American triumph. The actions of the President are to be 
praised as cautious, firm, and courageous. He consulted with intelligent and 
appropriate individuals who returned to him thoughtful, useful, and largely correct 
information which he used in formulating responses to the aggression presented him. 
The decisions of JFK and the Executive Committee with regards to their diagnosis of 
the Soviet build of missiles in Cuba as a threat to the U.S. were correct, and the 
decision to enforce a naval blockade of the island was the best of all possible tactics 
presented. The American government showed its allies and foes alike that it is 
committed to remaining firm in its political posture and would not allow its policy to be 
compromised so close to home. The traditionalist school claims that the Soviets 
provoked and the Americans persevered. The West was once again safe due to the 
efforts and actions of President John F. Kennedy and the Executive Committee of the 
National Security Council. This philosophy of thought surrounding the crisis may best 
be summed up by Sorensen, 
"Some ask: What if Khrushchev had not backed down? Others say: Why did we 
settle for so little? The real question is: Where would we be if JFK had not 
pursued [the course of action he did] and accepted Khrushchev's offer in a way 
that avoided the need for anyone to back down"(Sorensen, C, 192}. 
The Revisionist Interpretation 
Revisionist Cuban missile crisis theorists dispute each of the claims made by 
the traditionalists concerning the success of the crisis, as well as bring to light other 
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symptoms that lead to their conclusion that the crisis was not the sweeping American 
foreign policy success story court historians are claiming. The revisionists hold fast to 
the claim that Kennedy needlessly risked war to satisfy doubts about his own 
international foreign policy image and to bolster his own popularity which would help 
return a Democratic Congress later in November. They question the threat of the 
missiles and hold the naval blockade to be an inept and clumsy decision. The use of 
the Executive Committee during the crisis is also questioned by revisionists, who 
believe that overall the crisis was resolved due to a moderate Soviet military attitude 
and sheer luck on the side of America. 
The first area of United States policy toward Cuba during the crisis to come 
under fire by the revisionists was the decision by JFK and Ex Comm that the IRBM and 
MRBM missiles were a large enough threat to warrant action. One of the first 
revisionists was I.F. Stone, a Washington journalist whose initial critiques of the crisis 
have been developed into what today is the current areas of contention between the 
two schools (Divine, 151). Stone claimed that the Soviet launch stations in Cuba 
• .. did not make that much difference· (Stone, 12). He supported his position with the 
Horelick Air Force Study, which investigated the strategic importance of the missiles. 
Stone quoted the study as saying that the launch sites were • ... highly vulnerable to a 
U.S. first strike, even with conventional bombs·(Stone, 13). The Horelick study went 
on to say that the number of silos constructed in Cuba were far too small to constitute 
Soviet first strike capability. In addition, the study maintained that given the available 
technology of the time, the Soviets would have had difficulty in timing the launches of 
the missiles in Cuba with that of the missiles in the Soviet Union. If the misSiles in 
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Cuba were fired at the same time as those in Russia, the ones from nearby Cuba 
would have landed so far in advance as to give the U.S. additional, precious warning 
time (Stone, 16). Even Secretary of Defense McNamara candidly remarked that • ... a 
missile is a missile. It makes no great difference whether you are killed by a missile 
fired from the Soviet Union or from Cuba· (Abel, 124). The question of the revisionists 
about the true nature of the missiles actual or perceived threat capability did not rest in 
the domestic sphere. The problem was raised with regards to the reaction to crisis by 
the nations of western and eastem Europe, the United Nations, and the members of 
the Organization of American States, as well as NATO. The United States had its own 
Jupiter nuclear missiles in Turkey. American Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai 
Stevenson • ... forecast grave difficulties ... conceming the Jupiter bases in Turkey· 
(Stone, 15). Stevenson said at the White House on October 20 that • ... people would 
certainly ask why it was right for the United States to have bases in Turkey but wrong 
for the Russians to have bases in Cuba· (Stone, 15). Revisionists also point to the 
possible perception European nations might have to the reaction of the U.S. to the 
situation. Stone, ever the consummate revisionist, even quotes the classic traditionalist 
Sorensen stating • ... most Europeans cared nothing about Cuba and thought we were 
over anxious about it· (Stone, 12). While this statement does seem to arguably have 
been taken out of context by Stone to suit his needs, he does catch Sorensen asking a 
very important question, one asked by revisionists themselves: ·Would they [the 
nations of Europe] support our [the U.S.] risking a world war, or an attack on NATO 
member Turkey, or a move on West Berlin, because we had a few hostile missiles 
nearby?·(Stone, 14). The revisionist question about the perception of the crisis by 
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other nations is, in short, would European countries who had so long lived under the 
nuclear gun of both the United States and the U.S.S.A. understand what all the fuss 
was about? Stone suggested that the revisionists would answer the same as those 
European nations: no. 
Another point in regards to the actual or perceived threat of the Soviet silos 
comes as an attack on the Kennedy administration's claim that the missiles 
themselves were of an offensive nature. New Left writer and Canadian philosopher 
Leslie Dewart argues that these so called offensive weapons were nothing of the kind. 
Dewart claims that the distinguishing factor which necessarily makes a weapon 
offensive is the • ... actual possibilities of its being used to attack·(Dewart, 24). He goes 
on to give an example of a rifle or pistol being offensive in relation to an unarmed man. 
But, states Dewart, • ... the same weapons in the Cuban millitia's hands could hardly be 
considered offensive in relation to the U.S. of 1962"(Dewart, 36). Though Dewart's 
example and definition may be grounds for argumentation, the point of revisionist 
thought is made clear: was the placement of missiles in Cuba by the RUSSians an 
intolerable provocation as the traditionalists suggest? Were they, the revisionists might 
ask, even so undoubtedly offensive in nature as the Kennedy administration 
maintains? 
This school of historic thought also takes issue with the way Ex Comm had 
operated throughout the crisis. Traditionalists long have applauded the fact that Ex 
Comm operated without an official leader. Everyone in the meetings supposedly 
spoke as equals. On the occasion when the presence of Kennedy, merely by the 
nature of his pOSition, made such open discussion difficult he would make himself 
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conspicuously absent. The revisionists condemn this leaderless style and the fact that 
few men on the Committee had either military or diplomatic relations experience as a 
wholly preposterous way to run negotiations, especially given the nature of the ones 
being run at the time. Former National Security Council member and part time Ex 
Comm member Dean Acheson expressed these exact concerns, adding that • ... this is 
not the way the National Security Council operated at any time during which I was 
officially connected with it: nor, I submit, the way it should operate· (Acheson, 76). 
The view held by traditionalists about the effectiveness and intelligence of the 
decision to quarantine Cuba also falls under heavy revisionist scrutiny. The blockade 
is charged with being wholly ineffective towards the apparent goal of missile removal. 
It is also diplomatically illegal, charge the revisionist camp. For Acheson the 
quarantine did not remove the cHance of military aggreSSion, it merely postponed it, 
and in doing so made it possibly more potent. Acheson argued that the quarantine first 
allowed the Soviets time to finish the launch sites already in progress, and secondly 
gave the Russians the option of ramming the blockade. This, for Acheson, turned 
Cuba into a • ... combination porcupine and cobra·(Acheson, 76). It left the Soviets in 
·control of the future· , not the United States. For this school of Cuban missile crisis 
thought the blockade • ... was a way a keeping things out, not getting them 
out·(Acheson, 75). They called the quarantine a ·blunt instrument· that was entirely ·ill 
adapted to the purpose" of removing the Kremlin weapons. Dewart added to even 
these charges in arguing that the mere installation of the blockade by the United 
States was ·glaringly illegal" and that the presence of the 'offensive' weapons in Cuba 
in no way ·violated international law· (Dewart, 38). For the revisionists the quarantine 
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was not warranted, not effective, and certainly not legal. It was the "last resort of a 
cornered man [Kennedy]" (Stone, 15). 
The final major point presented by most revisionists to further their critical 
examination of the crisis is not one usually addressed directly by most traditionalists, if 
it is addressed at all. If the court historians do pay attention to this issue it is usually 
done as a side note or as a retaliation due some revisionist attack. This final major 
point of contention centers around the idea that Kennedy took the stance he did in 
Cuba for domestic political purposes. JFK, it is charged, wished to return a Democratic 
congress to the Hill and improve his own' popularity standings. Sorensen and other 
traditionalists vehemently deny any domestic political motivations on the part of 
Kennedy. Sorensen had been quoted as saying as he sat with the President on the 
back porch of the White House on Black Saturday during the height of the crisis that 
JFK did not talk of the possibility of his own death " ... but of all the innocent children of 
the world who never had a chance or voice" (Stone, 16). Revisionists are quick to 
retort that if Kennedy was truly sO concemed he might have sacrificed his chances in 
the election to try and negotiate. Stone bluntly writes "Kennedy could not wait, but the 
country and the world could" (Stone, 13). Revisionists contend, Stone among them, 
that if Khrushchev had not backed down when he did, but instead had waited for the 
decision of a United Nations debate, the Republicans would have accused President 
Kennedy of being both gullible and weak. Accusations like that could have cost the 
Democrats their majority in the House of Representatives. Such accusations would be 
tough obstacles to climb in any time period of American politics. They were especially 
deadly during the era of the mid 1960's when being considered 'soft on communism' 
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could destroy a career. Sorensen himself received a note expressing great concern 
from an unidentified individual (presumably an Ex Comm member) during one of the 
debates on the crisis which said if the missiles in Cuba were allowed to become 
operational, the House would more than likely be returned that November with a 
Republican majority (Stone, 13). 
There are others in the revisionist school who agree that Kennedy did more 
than likely hold the question of the coming elections in his mind throughout the crisis 
negotiations. They, however, do not feel that this was indicative of some kind of malice 
on the part of JFK, nor that it was inappropriate. Former Foreign Service Officer and 
revisionist usually mentioned in the same breath as Stone, Ronald Steel, speaks to 
this issue: 
"It is not to degenerate John F. Kennedy's patriotism to assume that he was 
aware of such possibilities [that if the missiles were left operational he may have 
committed political suicide] . Nor is it to question the motives of those who took 
part in those exhausting, often stormy meetings during those thirteen days. It 
would have been political folly for Kennedy to have broached the subject of 
election before Ex Comm where it would have fallen on deaf ears" (Steel, 22). 
Steel seems to be the middle ground between the traditionalists portrayal of 
Kennedy as the political altruist and the hard core revisionists, who tried to portray JFK 
as some kind of politically evil minded, callous, uncaring leader. 
The revisionist view of the Cuban missile crisis attacks the notions set forth by 
the administration at the time and those by the traditionalists to come directly 
afterward. They claim that the missiles were not the threat the government said. They 
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make noise as to whether or not the Russian missiles were technically offensive in 
nature. They condemn Ex Comni structurally, procedurally, and on its decided courses 
of action. And finally the courageous image of JFK cultivated by the traditionalists is 
tarnished with accusations of sheer political gain as motivation throughout the crisis. 
Overall the methods utilized in the affair are refuted. The individuals involved are 
accused of •.. operating on the basis of limited perspectives and short run calculations· 
(Stone, 16). It has been charged that the ironic outcome of the crisis was not "this is 
what to avoid·, but that it • ... contributed to the euphoria of power the led Kennedy's 
successor ... to have his own Iittle,war in Southeast ASia·(Stone, 16). It has been stated 
in more recent years that though the Cuban missile crisis was an important event in 
the world of political negotiations, the times and current situations of pOlitical realms 
throughout the globe have changed so much as to put the crisis into antiquity. Even 
given this trend in current diplomatic thought, an accusation such that the Viet Nam 
War, and Lyndon Johnson's decisions about that war, had begun to gestate during the 
Cuban missile crisis is a formidable one indeed. 
In total, the revisionist argument can be broken down into five main points: 1. 
Kennedy refused to use traditional methods of diplomacy that would have resolved the 
crisis quietly, 2. He did so because he needed a foreign policy 'victory', 3. the 
intelligence analysis and data interpretation had been obtuse, 4. the administration did 
not understand why the Soviets would find it politically advantageous to put missiles in 
Cuba, and finally, 5. the stakes were not so high as the public was lead to believe. 
Revisionists contend that the overall crisis was· .. the best of therapies for 
Kennedy's nagging inferiOrity complex·, and that the· ... deeper reaches of the story are 
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avoided, as if we feared to look too closely in the larger implications· the affair in Cuba 
would bring out. These implications might, revisionists might say, reveal some flaw in 
the fabric of the porcelain complexion that is remembered to be one of the JFK 
administration. 
Recent Deyelopments 
There have been a number of new developments concerning the Cuban missile 
crisis in the last decade. The governments of the United States, the former Soviet 
Republics, and even that of Cuba itself has declassified literally tons of materials 
formerly unavailable to scholars. This has allowed many facts not known at the time to 
come to light. It has allowed those involved in the crisis to have a greater 
understanding of what the other side knew and how that effected the decisions made. 
It also givers the Russians, Americans, and Cubans the chance to see how their own 
side was perceived by the other two. The declassification of material has allowed 
these govemments to see how their decisions were perceived and acted upon. It has 
allowed them to judge whether or not the messages sent out were understood in the 
manner they were meant. The Cuban missile crisis may now be looked at with greater 
objectivity and therefore as a kind of case study in brinkmanship. 
Another recent event is the Hawks Cay Convention. Held in the last decade, this 
conference featured the surviving members of Ex Comm, many department members 
from the Kennedy administration, and even a select group of statesmen from Cuba 
and the Soviet Union. They assembled to discuss the Cuban missile crisis in the 
context of its own time period as well as the lessons that may have been learned. 
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They discussed its importance in regards to what it has to offer diplomats, politicians, 
and military strategists of the contemporary age. 
The break up of the former Soviet Republics has also been useful in the 
understanding of the crisis. Up until this decade, the contribution by the Soviet 
government to the objective documentation of the crisis has been minimal. when there 
was information contributed it was characteristically biased. It was filled with more 
rhetoric than fact. Within the last two years writers in the former Republics have been 
allowed greater freedom in workrng on the Caribbean Crisis, as it is called there, as 
well as a relatively more relaxed atmosphere in regards to the accessing of 
information. There have been a number of works by Russian scholars and those using 
information gathered from Russia published that are true historical records published 
in the last year. 
Evaluation of InterpretatIons 
Both interpretations of the. crisis offer thoughtful and thorough examinations. 
Each overall argument made by the two schools is consistent with the viewpoint put 
forth by that particular school. There are several areas that do, however, warrant 
further evaluation. 
The revisionists quickly try to dismiss the claim made by the Kennedy 
administration that the missiles were a threat warranting action. They based this 
argument on two points. First they argued that the missiles did not truly change the 
balance of power neither in fact, nor appearance. Secondly they argued that action by 
the U.S. toward the placement of these missiles would not be understood by the 
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member of NATO and the Untie~ Nations. The reason for this misunderstanding would 
stem from the U.S. having its own Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Why is it wrong for one 
country to have missiles close to its adversary, the revisionists asked, and right for the 
other? One area that this view did not mention in this stage of its argument is the 
thought process going on in American foreign policy at the time. Kennedy had 
defeated conservative Republican Nixon in the 1960 elections. Nixon had risen to 
prominence in his career partly due to his support of Senator MaCarthy's political 
purge of communism in the United States government in the 1950's. The Korean War 
had also shown the U.S. commitment to its policy of 'containment'. This policy involved 
the concept of 'monolithic communism'. Any move by a government in the world 
toward becoming communist was seen as directed by the Soviets themselves. It was 
the Untied States policy to contain this communism. The U.S. did not want communist 
governments existing outside the U.S.S.A. The war in Korea put the Communist 
backed North against the U.S. backed South in a perfect example of the kind of 
conflicts with which this policy dealt. For Kennedy not to have at least stated that he 
and his administration considered this bold move by the Communists to be a threat 
could have meant the end of his career. Those in the Republican party would have 
labeled him 'soft' on Communism.; In the context of the time this crisis occurred, a label 
such as that would hae had detrimental effects to Kennedy's ability to effective create 
and implement foreign policy at least. He could have arguably been voted out of the 
White House. 
This brings up the next part of the revisionist argument that needs to be pointed 
out. They claimed that Kennedy used the crisis to increase his popularity and to return 
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complied would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that is the major deciding factor 
motivating Kennedy. It does appear that the pOlitics of the up coming election were, at 
the very least, in the back of Kennedy's mind. The pOlitical motivation should not be 
seen as a necessarily incorrect or 'bad' one. If Kennedy had not returned a Democratic 
House in November of 1962 it would have made it extremely difficult to deal with the 
crisis had it persisted longer. If more military action had been needed it would certainly 
been more difficult to get the supportive legislation needed from a House Republican 
majority. The Republicans could have certainly changed their attack on Kennedy once 
the elections were over if they had won. They could have stopped saying Kennedy 
was 'soft' on Communism and begun to say he was needlessly endangering the 
United States. Such maneuvers have been made by both parties throughout many 
different military conflicts in U.S. history. Asking a poltical leader not to think poltically 
is not easy to do. The revisionistS seemed to want Kennedy to go from hardnosed 
statesmen to some kind of President-in-a-vacuum. This type of jump is difficult if not 
impossible. It is also not practical for a world leader to consider. 
The revisionists do make a better argument in regards to Ex Comm. The 
traditionalists said the leaderless nature of Ex Comm was an advantage to the 
decision making process. The revisionists used a number of examples to counter this 
claim successfully. First they argued the leaderless nature of the Ex Comm meetings 
were ineffective. Without someone to focus the debates, the arguments got off target or 
even were made to serve the interests of the departments involved. With a definite 
leader the meetings could have had an agenda to follow and been more efficient. This 
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efficiency was vital to correct decision making according to the revisionists. Another 
point for the revisionists is that the leaderless style of Ex Comm was dangerous. Few 
of the men involved in the debates had been elected to office. Fewer still had real 
experience in such diplomatic relations. This is a questionable tactic. It is not to say 
that the men being consulted by the President were not of high intellect. Nor is it to say 
that these men were not capable of giving thoughtful, useful advice. It is alarming that 
the people making the decisions in the crisis were not directly lead by the President in 
their discussions and that very few of these men outside Kennedy were accountable to 
the people by way of elections. 
Both interpretations make valid claims. The traditionalists seem to be caught up 
in the sentimental memory of Kennedy and Camelot. The revisionists sometimes seem 
to want to tarnish this image as much as the court historians wish to protect it. With the 
recent developments concerning the crisis a middle interpretation seems to be slowly 
emerging. It takes into account Kennedy's cultural contributions to the U.S. of the early 
1960's as the traditionalist would like. This new moderate school also takes the 
objective approach in evaluating his performance taking into account the sentimental 
frame of reference. This view can be noticed in Steel's quotation in the revisionists 
section of this paper. This interpretation has been made possible largely through the 
continued amount of information being made available, as well as the constructive use 
of hindsight. One thing that should be kept in mind is that those involved in the Cuban 
missile crisis at the time did not know how it was going to turn out, recent historians 
do. 
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Conclusion 
The crisis has something to offer that goes beyond the political arena in which it 
was conducted. The main purpose of this paper was to reflect on the different ways in 
which noted scholars view of specific event in history for the purpose of detailing that 
event in itself. In the process, this study illustrates how history is recorded, sometimes 
subjectified, and then rebroadcast for the nest batch of readers, writers, and students 
to pour over and contemplate. 
The court historians and the reviSionists attitudes offer opposing views about 
the Cuban missile crisis. Their ongoing disagreement demonstrates that the pursuit of 
history is as active and organic concept. History if the reanimation of an era. It is not 
the discussion of dusty figures in the nonconsequential past. It is what we as historians 
and students make it, for better or for not. To say that it is difficult to arrive at a 
conclusion on something like the Cuban missile crisis is only to prove the point. Each 
time some event, person, or era is returned to the light of contemporary academe, it is 
allowed a fresh start and a new appearance. That is what makes history. 
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Chronology 
1 January 1959 
15 April 1959 
11 January 1960 
11 July 1960 
19 October 1960 
3 January 1961 
13 February 1961 
17-20 April 1961 
1 May 1961 
21 October 1961 
27 July 1962 
29 August 1962 
4-13 September 1962 
14 October 1962 
16 October 1962 
22 October 1962 
24 October 1962 
26-27 October 1962 
28 October 1962 
20 November 1962 
Cuba's President Batista resigns; Castro's Revolutionary forces gain 
control. 
U.SJCuba discussion on economic relatiOns begin. 
U.S. ambassador protests the Cuban seizure of American property 
Soviet Chairman Krushchev offers "rocket" support. 
U.S. embargoes all exports to Cuba excepting medicine and food. 
U.S. severs diplomatic relations wHh CUba. 
SovieVCuban trade agreement completed. 
Bay of Pigs invasion fails. 
Castro announces he is a socialist. 
U.S. indicates Hs superiorHy In nuclear weapons; there is no miSSile 
gap. 
Castro indicates Cuba will soon have new defenses against U.S. 
U2 photos verify SAM defense missiles in Cuba. 
Kennedy wams Moscow not to place offensive missiles in Cuba. 
U2 photos disclose MRBM and IRBM launch pads under 
construction in Cuba. 
First two secret seSSions of ExComm to advise Kennedy. 
JFK's speech intorms public of the missiles and announces 
naval quarantine. 
Soviet ships acknowledge the U.S. blockade. 
Washington receives two letters from Moscow regarding a deal for 
moving Soviet missiles. 
Khrushchev agrees to remove Soviet missiles and accepts 
Kennedy's pledge not to Invade Cuba. 
U.S. announces removal from Cuba of the last Soviet missiles. 
adapted from Lebow's The Cuban Missile Crtsls ReyisHed 
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The Executlye Committee of the National Security Council 
McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor 
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State 
Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense 
Robert Kennedy, Attorney General 
John McCone, CIA Director 
Douglas Dillion, Secretary of the Treasury 
Theodore Sorensen, Presidential Counsel 
George Ball, Under Secretary of State 
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State 
General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of Joint Cheifs of Staff 
Edward Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America 
Llewellyn Thompson, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President 
Adlai Stevenson, Ambassador to the United Nations 
John F. Kennedy, President 
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